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Introduction 
Cossack explorers discovered the sturgeon-shaped island just beyond the mouth of the Amur 
River during the seventeenth century. By the beginning of the eighteenth, Russia like the rest of 
Europe had come to call this island in the North Pacific “Sakhalin”, a name descended from the 
Manchu word for “black”. Prior to 1875, again in 1904, and ever since World War II the 
Japanese have considered Sakhalin to be theirs. They call it “Karafuto”. Almost 600 miles long 
and covering nearly 30000 square miles, Sakhalin is one of the largest islands in the world with 
temperatures and geologic conditions varying greatly according to region. Its northern half is 
characterized by taiga and tundra; its southern by rugged mountains and thick forests. The 
climate is bone-chillingly cold in winter, foggy and damp in summer. In January temperatures 
average –11° (Fahrenheit) in the north and 21° in the south; in August, 50° in the north and 66° in 
the south. Natural vegetation in the wind-swept and icy north is limited to grasses and scrub 
brush; in the slightly more temperate south, where the soil is clayey, there are deciduous, 
coniferous, and even bamboo forests, with peat bogs near the coast. Throughout the island all 
types of biting insects “make the warm humid months an ordeal ...”2 
In the summer of 1875, after years of jockeying for position in the North Pacific, Russia and 
Japan signed the Treaty of St. Petersburg which gave Russia sovereignty over all of Sakhalin. 
Later that year an article in the influential Russian newspaper Golos (The Voice) identified three 
essential roles for this latest imperial acquisition.3 The first was military: Sakhalin would serve as 
an enormous fortress to guard the entrance to the Amur River and hence the region of that same 
name, which Russia had acquired just fifteen years earlier thanks to the efforts of N. N. Murav’ev-
Amurskii.4 The second role was economic: the island possessed “a rich mine of coal” which it was 
hoped would provide fuel for the nascent Pacific Fleet. The third role envisioned for Sakhalin was 
a penal one: Golos argued that the island should be turned into a huge colony to which Russia 
might commit its worst offenders. Like Australia had been for Great Britain and Devil’s Island 
still was for France, Sakhalin – some 4000 miles from St. Petersburg – could serve the Russian 
Empire as a realm of banishment seemingly as far away from the heart of society as the moon. 
However, unbeknownst to Golos, the decision to transform Sakhalin into a penal colony had 
already been made. Indeed internal documents of the Eastern Siberian Administration (Glavnoe 
Upravlenie Vostochnoi Sibiri – GUVS), which had jurisdiction over the island, reveal that a de 
facto decision high in the Russian government was reached as early as 1868, seven years before the 
Treaty of St. Petersburg. These and other sources show that the autocracy made a fateful and tragic 
decision and that it felt compelled to establish a penal colony on Sakhalin because, by the 1860s, 
its exile penal labor system, known as katorga, was in a state of turmoil. So powerful was this 
compulsion that even when evidence indicated Sakhalin’s soil and climatic conditions prohibited 
the development of a productive agricultural economy – upon which it was believed the colony 
could be based – authorities willfully ignored or covered up this evidence and went ahead with their 
plans. In order to better demonstrate this process I will describe it thematically rather than 
chronologically. I discuss first the nature of the penal colony itself; second, the evidence which 
clearly showed that a penal colony based upon an agricultural economy would not work on 
Sakhalin; third, the driving motivation behind the autocracy’s decision to establish, regardless of 
this evidence, a penal colony there; fourth, the manner in which this decision was arrived at; and 
finally, the way in which this decision was transformed into policy. 
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Sakhalin as penal colony 
Many Russians and foreigners visited Sakhalin in the years before the Russo-Japanese War, of 
whom the most renowned was Anton Chekhov. Sakhalin Island (Ostrov Sakhalin), a 
journalistic account of his 1891 visit provides some of the most vivid depictions of life in the penal 
colony. “The vices and perversions which may be observed among the exiles”, he concluded, 
are those which are peculiar to enslaved, subjected, hungry and frightened people. Lying, cunning, 
cowardice, meanness, informing, robbery, every kind of secret vice – such is the arsenal which these 
slavelike people, or at least the majority of them, employ against the officials and guards they despise, 
fear and regard as their enemies.5 
Despite the abolition of corporal punishment in the 1860s and of the death penalty a century 
earlier, convicts on Sakhalin were regularly beaten and sometimes hanged by the military 
administration. Wardens starved and tortured their prisoners, and chained them to wheelbarrows 
for years at a time as punishment for attempted escapes. During his visit Chekhov was vouchsafed 
the dubious honor of attending a flogging. “After the first five or ten strokes [the victim’s] body, 
covered by scars from previous beatings, turns blue and purple, and his skin bursts at each stroke”, 
recorded the playwright with feigned dispassion. “Through the shrieks and cries there can be 
heard the words: ‘Your worship! Your worship! Mercy your worship! ’ 6  
Charles Hawes, an Englishman who visited Sakhalin a decade after Chekhov, described among 
other things the butchering of native families by gangs of runaway criminals and the deaths by 
exposure of convicts forced to pull timber through coastline surfs. He referred to prostitution as 
the real “hard labor” for Sakhalin’s female population and was particularly incensed by the sex 
trade which operated unhindered (indeed was abetted) by the administration. Exiled couples 
regularly prostituted their prepubescent daughters in an attempt to derive an income. As a result, 
wrote Hawes, “There is not a girl over nine years of age on the island who is a virgin”.7 
Responding to this, and similar exposes, a British publication in 1905 declared Sakhalin “the 
most notorious penal settlement in the world”.8 
As of 1897 Sakhalin had a total population of 28113 people. Indigenous natives (Giliaks, Oroks, 
Ainu) represented 15 percent; peasants and Cossacks, virtually all of whom were former convicts, 
comprised a third; and exiles made up 47 percent. In addition to these groups there was a small 
number of administrators, soldiers, townspeople, clergy, and foreigners. Almost half the 
population was between the ages of 20 and 40; three-quarters was male. More than twenty-five 
languages and language groups were represented on the island, including Ukrainian, Armenian, 
Finnish, and Tatar. Great Russian was the principal language for 56 percent of the island’s 
inhabitants.9 
Therefore, by the end of the nineteenth century this was the penal colony which had been 
created by mandate decades earlier: almost no productive farm plots existed anywhere on the 
island; what did exist was a subhuman realm comprising murderers, rapists, and thieves; exiles 
who mutilated and maimed themselves to avoid labor assignments; families whose only source 
of income was the prostitution of their children; and Giliak bounty hunters who earned three 
rubles for each severed head of a runaway convict they turned in to officials. This realm was 
made all the worse by the syphilis, cholera, and scurvy which regularly afflicted the 
“unfortunates,” as they were commonly and appropriately referred to in popular parlance. In 
short, Sakhalin possessed one of the most wretched collections of humanity ever assembled. 
 
Early indicators 
Years before it decided to officially transform Sakhalin into a penal colony the state sent small 
numbers of penal laborers, called katorzhnye, to the island for the purpose of mining coal. 
Military expeditions had discovered coal there as early as 1851, and Petersburg hoped that its 
extraction would become a major enterprise. By early 1868 there were 400 katorzhnye assigned 
to the shafts at Dué Post, a dilapidated prison poised on an outcropping of rock halfway up the 
west coast. The early mining operations as led by the local military command were beset by poor 
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organization and terrible living conditions, and consequently yielded little. In August 1869 the 
mainland administration sent another 450 katorzhnye to Sakhalin, 350 of whom it assigned to the 
Dué mines. However, many of the katorzhnye nominally assigned to mining actually engaged in a 
desperate effort to grow the cabbages and potatoes they and their jailers needed to keep from 
starving. This was because ice prevented the shipping of supplies to the island for several months 
out of the year; and even when the Tatar Straits were clear, there was still an insufficient amount 
of food due to poor organization and the absence of ships to deliver it.10 
In 1870 Dué’s mines yielded just 4660 tons of coal. In May 1872 there were 643 exiles on 
Sakhalin, yet no more than 400 were actually assigned to coal-mining.11 Given the local 
military’s inability to properly manage operations, the government in 1875 entered into a lease 
agreement with a joint-stock venture calling itself the “Sakhalin Company”. By 1890 Sakhalin’s 
annual coal production had increased to 18000 tons; yet as John Stephan has noted “This output 
never became a significant factor in Russia’s total coal production (6609000 tons in 1890)”.12 
There was never a time when more than a few hundred of the thousands of convicts eventually 
exiled to Sakhalin worked in the mines. The government’s initial plan that Sakhalin’s katorga 
regimen would center around mining, as those at Nerchinsk and Kara did, soon disappeared 
when it realized that even in the most optimistic scenario Dué’s operations could utilize no more 
than 1200 laborers.13 Instead planners began to envision that exiles sent to the island would labor 
as agriculturalists instead. 
This desire by the state to transform convicts into peasants continued a tradition dating back to 
1593, when Boris Godunov sent the first group of exiles across the Urals. However, despite its 
singular grandiosity, the Sakhalin plan also marked the continuity of the autocracy’s stubborn 
refusal over the course of three centuries to recognize the futility of this coercive task. This 
refusal of recognition is highlighted by the fact that between 1868 and 1875 it unequivocally 
committed itself to a project despite a mountain of evidence showing it could not work. 
 
The evidence 
Let us consider such evidence. Since the late seventeenth century Russian, European, and Asian 
naval explorers had been mapping and writing about Sakhalin, all the while gathering information 
about its weather and climate. In the three decades before 1870 Russia sent several expeditions 
to the island.14 N. V. Busse, who would die from syphilis in 1866 while serving as Amur 
District’s first governor, commanded one of these expeditions which scoured the island from 
August 1853 to May 1854. While there, he meticulously recorded temperatures and other 
important agricultural indicators in a diary which was published serially in Vestnik Evropy 
(European Herald) in 1871 – the very year Petersburg committed itself unequivocally to 
establishing a penal colony on Sakhalin.15 
In addition to this convergence of dates it should be pointed out that all of Russia’s explorers 
to the island served in either the military or civil services. Thus top decision-makers must have 
had access to their reports, which explicitly stated among other things that the indigenous Ainu, 
Giliaks, and Oroks depended for their food upon, not agriculture but rather hunting, fishing, and 
trading. Knowledge of these peoples’ millennium-old feeding traditions might have given 
Petersburg officials pause for thought as they contemplated the construction of an agriculturally-
based economy. Yet even though it is admittedly dubious that imperial Russians would ever have 
taken a cue from the very people they were supposedly introducing to civilization, such an idea 
is possible only on the presumption that they bothered to read expedition accounts in the first 
place. I find it nearly inconceivable that if any top official knew about this information and was 
seriously concerned with establishing a functioning penal colony on Sakhalin, that he then could 
have believed agriculture was the way to go about it. For as Chekhov, whom we know did read 
many of these early reports, was later to write, “meteorological tables and the brief reports of 
other writers present a general picture of exceptionally bad weather.” More specifically he noted 
that 
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In the Cherepovetsky district, where the summer is warmer and longer [than elsewhere on the island] 
..., buckwheat, cucumbers and wheat cannot ripen properly, while in the Aleksandrovsk region the local 
agricultural inspector insists that there has never been a year when the temperature was sufficiently 
high for oats and wheat to ripen.16 
 
But if officials did indeed read such reports, the point still remains the same: gross malfeasance 
in Petersburg led to the horrors which rendered the Sakhalin penal colony justifiably infamous. 
Whether politicians read these reports then simply ignored them, or neglected to read them but 
nevertheless made their decisions in ignorance, they clearly demonstrated neither leadership nor 
planning for Russia’s penological future, but rather only a contemptible retreat into cynicism and 
despair.17 
But first, there were opportunities for them to learn from their mistakes. In 1862 the 
government launched its first express attempt to settle “exile-settlers” (ssyl’nye poselentsy18) on 
Sakhalin. Fortunately this self-described “experiment” (opyt’) involved only eight male exiles, 
but they were treated extremely cruelly, like guinea pigs, in an effort that was doomed to fail. It 
took two years before the men could establish their own homesteads near the mouth of the 
Aleksandrovka River. But their harvests were too meager to live on and beginning in 1865 the 
administration issued each a certain annual amount of foodstuffs which, among other things, 
included two pods (c. 70 lbs.) of rye. Despite, or perhaps because of this aid, the homesteaders’ 
output declined further and their dependence on government rations increased. In 1870 all were 
transferred back to the mainland.19 
In 1869 the government launched another no less poorly conceived and executed plan to settle 
twenty-five families of nominally voluntary settlers (pereselentsy) on the island. After bungling 
their transport from the Siberian interior administrators finally delivered these families to 
Sakhalin just as winter hit. In mid-November soldiers marched the new arrivals into the middle 
of the wilderness, where they left them to fend for themselves. By building earthen shelters the 
settlers who remained somehow managed to survive; but many others wandered back to the 
coastline to beg for succor from the island command. As late as 1876 thirteen of these families 
still depended on government rations for their survival. 20 Although officials had hoped both the 
1862 and 1869 experiments would prove agriculture viable on Sakhalin, they proved just the 
opposite. Nevertheless officials ignored the results, placed blame on the “guinea pigs,” excused 
their own roles in the debacles, and forged ahead. 
As the government moved seemingly inexorably toward a conclusive decision to make 
Sakhalin a penal colony, there however still remained opportunities for reappraisal. Yet officials 
chose to ignore even contemporary reports from the island administration which detailed the 
katorzhnye’s inability to grow enough vegetables. For example in March 1871 Dué’s commander 
wrote to I. V. Furugeim, Primofe District’s military governor, explicitly stating there was “no 
possiblity for the development of an agricultural economy ...”21 The soil was too infertile, the 
climate too harsh. Cabbages and potatoes could be grown, but even these hardy stables were few. 
Despite much similar information detailing the failure to establish productive farming on 
Sakhalin, officials in Petersburg continued to believe that agriculture would provide exiles with 
the substance of life as well as the labor tasks their sentences required. Why? One reason was 
that there soon emerged “scientific evidence” to back up this belief, in the work of M. S. Mitsul’. 
Just as T. D. Lysenko bears the onus for the disasters of Soviet agriculture so too should 
Mitsul’ for tsarist Sakhalin’s agricultural travails. It is uncertain whether Mitsul’, an agronomist, 
was deluding himself or simply reporting what higher authorities wanted to hear when, following 
his 1870 inspection of the island, he described agricultural opportunities there as “ideal”. But it 
helps to know he made this observation within the context of his larger argument that Sakhalin 
should serve as a penal colony, in part because it was supposedly escape-proof.22 
Such a fortuitous marriage of science and convenience appears to have been just what V. I. 
Vlasov23 was looking for. Vlasov, who sat on Eastern Siberia’s Governing Council, also served 
as chief of that region’s Department of Executive Police (Departament politsii ispolnitel’noi). 
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Theoretically he answered to Governor-General N. P. Sinel’nikov (1871-1873) and his successor 
P. A. Frederiks (1873-1879). 24 Yet with DPI a subsection of the Ministry of the Interior 
(Ministerstvo vnutrennykh del – MVD), Vlasov’s primary allegiance was to then interior minister 
A. E. Timashev.25 Such an overlapping of authority characterized both the administrative 
structure which M. M. Speranskii designed for Siberia in 1822 and the ministerial apparatus he 
had created for the government twenty years earlier.26 Vlasov’s primary allegiance is important 
to bear in mind when considering his motives. 
In a lengthy report written in July 1873 and addressed to both Timashev and Sinel’nikov, 
Vlasov summarized the findings of an inspection tour which had brought him to Sakhalin two 
years earlier. Relying exclusively on Mitsul’s work he extolled the possibilities for a penal 
colony, proclaiming “On the basis of Sakhalin’s vegetation, especially in the southern part, there 
is every possibility for the successful cultivation of grains”. He went so far as to assert that a 
“minimum of 25-30 thousand people” could be settled there, albeit mostly in the south. 
Although both Vlasov and Mitsul’ mention in their writings the possibility for other “industries” 
on Sakhalin besides agriculture, such as timbering and fishing (both of which eventually 
employed very small numbers of exiles), neither place a great deal of emphasis on them, 
heralding instead the supposed opportunities for agriculture.27 
As should already be clear Mitsul’s and Vlasov’s forecasts bore no relationship to reality. 
Whether this was the result of cynicism, disingenuousness, or just plain naïveté is impossible to 
know for sure; but the fact that Mitsul’ favored the establishment of a penal colony and that 
Vlasov worked for the MVD strongly suggests that if cynicism itself was not their motivating 
factor then they were at least beholden to those for whom it was. 
Looking ahead for a moment, the following examples show the long-term effect of their 
forecasts. As of 1876 produce from the Dué model farm (ferm), which utilized exile labor, 
consisted almost entirely of cabbages and potatoes and even these were few in number. For this 
reason the mainland administration continued to provide most of the food Russian inhabitants 
required. Exiles and soldiers subsisted on a diet centered around bread (made largely from 
imported grain), cabbages, potatoes, and salted fish and beef.28 
In April 1881 the tsar ordered zoologist I. S. Poliakov to Sakhalin for the purpose of 
“zoological and anthropological research”. A well-heeled member of the Imperial Russian 
Geographic Society, Poliakov was a perspicacious scientist whose interests ranged far beyond 
the boundaries of his immediate discipline.29 Having seen little other than cabbages and potatoes 
being grown during his visit Poliakov concluded: 
If a modest agricultural economy is [to be] established on the island, then it will be through enormous 
labor and strength; [but] at the present time, considering the general number of people on the island, it 
[agriculture] may be considered worthless.”30 
A full decade later Chekhov found only a very small percentage of the population in and 
around Aleksandrovsk, Sakhalin’s largest settlement, working in agriculture. Along the nearby 
Duika River, where soil was marginally better than near the shoreline or toward the piedmont, a 
total of only thirty-six homesteaders grew produce while nine worked hayfields. The size of their 
plots ranged from 300 sazhens (one-third of an acre) to one desiatina (2.7 acres). Nearly 
everyone planted potatoes. Only sixteen homesteaders owned horses; thirty-eight, cows; but 
most of the livestock was in the hands of those who worked as traders rather than as food 
producers. No one in Aleksandrovsk had been there a decade or more: six had established 
homesteads in 1882; four in 1883; thirteen in 1884; and sixty-eight in 1885. The remaining 207 
had arrived later. Of the nearly three hundred people assigned to Aleksandrovsk only nineteen 
exiles had managed to attain peasant status.31 
Finally, the failure of both Sakhalin’s agricultural economy and the state’s general effort to 
transform convicts into cultivators is best summarized in a report by D. A. Driĺ, a criminologist 
from the Ministry of Justice who inspected the island in 1896.32 By that time Sakhalin had long 
been home to large numbers of exiles, and it was Driĺ’s task to assess the conditions in which 
they lived. Although on paper thousands of exiles and former exiles were assigned to individual 
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farmsteads, he found only 10 percent of these farmsteads had “any substance”. Of those 
remaining, half were “only pro forma, for 
[the benefit of the appearance of] the [Sakhalin] command ...”, while the rest were defunct, having been 
abandoned by those assigned to them. As a result government rations were still needed to keep alive the 
vast majority of exiles.33 
Thus agriculture on Sakhalin was an unmitigated failure. In 1884, by which year it cost the 
government as much as 375 rubles per convict to ship exiles from Odessa to Sakhalin, it cost 
another 150000 r. just to feed most of the island’s exiles and all of its administrators, guards, and 
soldiers.34 Moreover the later history of Sakhalin shows that at no time under the imperial regime 
was the penal colony ever able to feed itself. 
But in fully addressing the question of agriculture we have gotten ahead of ourselves, and so it is 
necessary to turn back in order to ask why the government felt so compelled to establish a penal 
colony on Sakhalin in the first place. 
 
Compulsion 
Although Petersburg could not have entirely foreseen the situation later so well described by 
Chekhov, Driĺ, and others it should have had forebodings based on well-known mistakes in the 
past, mistakes that involved many times more victims than the failed agricultural experiments of 
the 1860s but which had yielded similar results. From the 1730s through the 1850s the autocracy 
launched several large-scale attempts to establish penal colonies in various regions of Siberia, all 
of which failed and collectively caused death and misery for thousands of exiles.35 With such a 
track record why did top officials believe Sakhalin would be any different? 
The answer is they believed they had little choice. Although katorga (and to a great extent the rest 
of the exile system) virtually ceased to function during the 1860s, the autocracy refused to 
abolish Siberian exile and replace it with a nationwide prison system. This refusal was persistent 
despite successive ministers’ and commissions’ attempts ever since Peter the Great’s reign to 
persuade the Romanovs otherwise.36 Prisons administered at the regional level did exist in 
Russia and held rotating numbers of criminals for brief terms, as well as exiles awaiting transfer 
east; but these were too few to accommodate all those the courts convicted each year.37 As a result 
the state dealt with society’s worst offenders by exiling them to Siberia. This practice began in the 
late sixteenth century and by the mid-nineteenth had expanded enormously. Courts sentenced the 
most violent and dangerous exiles to special katorga prisons in Eastern Siberia, but the vast 
majority entered Siberia as “exile-settlers” (ssyl’no-poselentsy), whom officials simply 
distributed without money or other means amongst the local peasantry. However not all those 
exiled to Siberia were criminals sentenced by the judicial system. Fully half of the one million 
subjects exiled to Siberia during the nineteenth century went there as a result of “administrative 
procedures” instigated, for the most part, by commune assemblies and elders against their own 
neighbors.38 Due to the combination of a lack of funding, administrative chaos, disregard for 
existing laws, and institutionalized cruelty the Siberian exile system was a hulking failure, as 
evidenced in part by the fact that escape rates for all categories of exiles ranged between 25 and 
50 percent.39 
On the eve of the decision to turn Sakhalin into a penal colony there were many signs that the 
collapse of katorga in particular had reached critical mass. One major reason for this was the 
huge upsurge beginning in the 1860s in the number of people sent to Siberia. That decade alone 
nearly 120000 exiles and accompanying family members crossed the Urals.40 At certain times 
specific ethnic and religious groups comprised a disproportionate number of exiles. For example 
the autocracy exiled as many as 24 000 Poles in reprisal for the 1863 insurrection. Although 
most of these Poles were not sentenced to katorga, some 4000 were.41 These and other 
katorzhnye imposed a serious strain on a system already saturated with convicts. In 1868 M. S. 
Korsakov, then governor-general of Eastern Siberia, wrote a harried letter to the Interior 
Ministry explaining that the Nerchinsk and Kara mining regions east of Lake Baikal – locations 
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at that time of the only two major katorga regimes – were filling up. As a consequence he 
warned “there is not enough work for all the exile-laborers [ssyl’no-rabochikh]”.42 Korsakov 
requested that at least the Poles be relocated to the Altai Mining District in Western Siberia or to 
the Urals. At this stage the MVD and the Ministries of War and Justice were indeed struggling to 
find alternative locations for all katorzhnye,43 but were restricted by a law enacted in 1859 which 
prohibited their assignment to Western Siberia. Therefore the Poles remained where they were. 44 
While it is true that penal facilities were taxed by the massive numbers of exiles, many of the 
problems related to them were the result of negligence and malfeasance on the part of Siberian 
officialdom, which had a long and colorful history of corruption dating back to the early 1600s. 
In 1868, senior officials inspecting conditions in Kirensk District in Irkutsk Province determined 
that 
commands at certain local prisons and holding prisons [used during the transfer of exiles] are not 
observing proper procedure in the maintenance of arrestees held in those same places. For example: the 
cleanliness of clothes and linen is not being supervised, nor is the cleanliness of the arrestees 
themselves; the arrestees’ food is very meager and poorly-prepared; the arrestees’ only place for 
strolling and for fresh air – the courtyard – is untidy and filled with garbage: in all respects the latrines 
are in a poor state; in certain locations arrestees are never allowed into the courtyard for fresh air, 
regardless of good weather; in certain prison buildings the windows are knocked out, the cells are full 
of mud, the stoves are broken, [etc.] ...45 
 
Beginning (at the latest) during the 1860s, the organization responsible for assigning and 
distributing exiles within Siberia, the Tobol’sk Exile Office, encountered difficulty maintaining 
its records.46 This problem rippled through the Office’s subordinate, provincial Exile Bureaux and 
worsened over the course of the next decade. A circa 1877 report47 concerning the Irkutsk 
Bureau revealed that “from 1870 through 1875 ... when and where 429 katorzhnye were assigned 
is unknown”. Statistical logs which should have shown exiles’ arrival and departure dates to and 
from Irkutsk and other cities were typically bereft of information. In 1873 Irkutsk officials had 
distributed up to 340 katorzhnye without any reference to their court-mandated sentences: 
thus, for example, katorzhnye sentenced to fortress and mining labor in the Kara gold industries were 
removed to factories in Irkutsk Province ... and in some cases those who had received brief [i.e., 
temporary] sentences in the factories were removed to the Kara gold industries.48 
Because of the bureaucratic morass within Irkutsk’s holding prison, convicts scheduled for 
transfer were sometimes held “for several months and sometimes more than a year” longer than 
they should have been, languishing in their disease-ridden cells until some official finally got 
around to processing their cases. The report also showed that the Irkutsk Bureau regularly failed 
to provide clothes for katorzhnye located throughout Eastern Siberia, so that over a four-year 
period exiles in Balagnask Prison went for months at a time completely naked. As officials noted 
time and again in their correspondence, the Irkutsk Bureau clearly was “in disorder”. Largely in 
response to wretched living and working conditions a number of disturbances occurred among 
katorzhnye in the Kara and Nerchinsk mines during the late 1860s. Regional military 
administrators’ beliefs that such disturbances signaled a direct threat seem more than anything 
else to have focused Petersburg’s attention on the profound problems surrounding katorga. Most 
of the disturbances were minor and involved only political exiles, who represented just a small 
percentage of the katorzhnye; but there was a growing fear that these politicals would spark a 
general revolt among the entire exile population.49 
One example in particular highlights the paranoia which underlay these administrators’ fears. After 
having dealt with what was essentially a sit-down strike by political exiles at a couple mines in the 
Nerchinsk Mining District the district commander, Adol’f Knoblokh, described his actions to the 
governor of Irkutsk Province in a personal letter full enough of grammatical errors and odd word 
choices to suggest he did not know Russian well. First, Knoblokh had removed all books and writing 
materials from the prison cells, then, “having fettered the legs and arms of all the convicts without 
exception, I ordered them held [in] a narrow, locked cell, and [put] these same criminals on bread and 
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water. I promised them that they themselves would beg me to return them to the shafts”. The 
politicals did relent and agreed to reenter the shafts, though it is unclear how long it took for them to 
capitulate. But their protest had had an effect on their mine’s overseer Kuznetsov, who soon 
acknowledged the exiles’ earlier claims that some of the shafts were lacking in oxygen. Kuznetsov 
subsequently gave them permission to avoid these particular shafts. When he learned of this 
Knoblokh became outraged, as he wrote the governor, secure in his belief that Kuznetsov was a 
weakling and conditions in the shafts fine. “Regarding this [Kuznetsov’s decision] regrettably I am 
unable”, he laboriously scribbled. 
To not charge [with insubordination (?)] Overseer Lieutenant Kuznetsov, who has demonstrated 
throughout this affair incomprehensible weakness and unresourcefulness. A little bit of energy on his 
part at the very beginning, and the matter would not have reached such [proportions].50 
 
Although like Knoblokh many officials believed a firm hand was all that was needed to keep 
katorzhnye in line, reports such as his also proved unsettling to those with somewhat broader 
perspectives. This eventually led to a fateful decision. 
 
Decision made, decision confirmed 
In 1868 Alexander II responded to what was officially termed “the collapse of katorga” by 
appointing representatives from the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, and Finance to form a so-
called Special Committee to investigate the issue. As of that year there were some 12000 
katorzhnye in Siberia, and the first major task before the committee was to ascertain how 
conditions might be created to allow these convicts to fulfil the hard labor portions of their 
sentences. The committee’s second major task was to find a solution to the problem of escape, 
which loosed upon Siberian society thousands of desperate fugitives each year.51 
The two documents which describe the activities of this committee contain slightly conflicting 
evidence as to when the government finally decided to establish a new katorga regime and penal 
colony on Sakhalin. One of these documents is a copy of a report by Vlasov to Korsakov just 
before the governor-general died in November 1871, which lays out the former’s 
recommendations on this issue. The copy is undated; yet because VIasov’s inspection did not 
end until September 1871 we know both the original and its copy were produced sometime 
shortly thereafter, while Korsakov remained among the living. The second document is a copy of 
a report read into the minutes (zhurnal) of the GUNS Governing Council on 13 October 1872.52 
Interior Minister Timashev would later claim the Special Committee chose Sakhalin only after a 
careful review of Vlasov’s and other evidence.53 Yet due to the timing of events which follow, it 
strongly appears this was not the case. Instead the Special Committee’s decision was made for it 
sometime earlier by a higher authority, and therefore its role was that of a mere rubber-stamp. 
Part of the evidence for this comes from Vlasov himself, who relates that in August 1869 the 
regime dispatched 800 katorzhnye to Sakhalin so that the just-convened Special Committee 
could conduct yet another, albeit much larger “experiment”, this time to determine the 
feasibility of not just agricultural settlement in general but a large-scale agriculturally-based 
penal colony per se. Lack of logistical coordination and the inabilities of local officials account 
for why only half the convicts actually reached Sakhalin. Moreover their behavior once there 
was so violent it actually caused the emperor to seriously consider reinstituting capital 
punishment across the board. Who actually ordered the 800 katorzhnye to the island in the first 
place is unclear, but it would seem to have been a figure high in government, for despite the 
operation’s utter failure, the Special Committee amazingly concluded Sakhalin would be a fine 
location for a penal colony.54 
Nonetheless, the GUVS Council report asserts that not until April 1871 did the Special 
Committee “persuade” Korsakov that a new katorga regime should be established on Sakhalin, 
and therefore it requested his cooperation in developing a plan to make this possible.55 Vlasov 
writes that the committee did not reach this decision until mid-May, prior to which, he claims, 
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the committee could agree only that “a distant colony” had to be established in order to salvage 
katorga. Although he infers that it seemed likely to choose Sakhalin, he also asserts that other 
locations were supposedly being considered. What these were he does not say, however.56 
In either case the above series of events means, that when Timashev dispatched Vlasov to 
inspect katorga sites in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East and “to research and report on 
[Sakhalin’s] topgraphy ...”, the decision was a foregone conclusion.57 Even Vlasov himself later 
paradoxically admitted the committee reached its decision about Sakhalin “without any data on 
the island”.58 Needless to say, this begs the question of how the committee knew it would be a 
suitable place for the penal colony. Well, of course, it did not. But for the regime this was not the 
point. The point was simply to get rid of the exiles and the problems they were causing on the 
Siberian mainland. As alluded to earlier, Timashev in 1876 claimed that not until late 1872 did the 
committee complete its analysis of the research from Vlasov’s and other reports. Only then, 
according to the interior minister’s scenario, did it decide “conditions [on Sakhalin] were 
favorable”.59 But Timashev’s was a lie designed to cover his own rear and possibly those of 
others, for as we have seen, not later than 1868-1869 were certain powers intent on placing a 
colony on Sakhalin and nowhere else. 
Vlasov left Irkutsk in June 1871 and traveled through Transbaikalia and Amur Districts to the 
Pacific coast, whence he crossed over to Sakhalin in September. Given what had earlier 
transpired within the Special Committee it is clear, despite Vlasov’s, Timashev’s, and the 
Governing Council’s later assertions to the contrary, that the findings of the MVD lackey were 
predicated on his knowledge the choice would (and could only be) Sakhalin. Therefore it should 
come as no surprise that, despite some remarkably candid statements about purely administrative 
conditions on Sakhalin,60 Vlasov told his superiors what they wanted to hear. As noted, he relied 
entirely on Mitsuĺ’s work and mentioned no conflicting evidence. 
The nature of the procedure between 1868 and 1871 which resulted in a plan to transform 
Sakhalin into a penal colony shows this resolution was preordained from above. The candidate 
most likely to have sought this resolution was Timashev, likely with strong backing from Eastern 
Siberia’s Governor-general Korsakov and possibly the emperor as well. If so, this means both 
the Special Committee’s and Vlasov’s efforts to ascertain Sakhalin’s suitability as a location 
were merely shadow plays designed to create the illusion of informed decision-making. Why 
would such deception have been necessary? If it was Timashev who ordered this resolution, then 
he needed to protect himself against possible future political attacks by making it appear he had 
consulted the appropriate ministries and experts for their advice. But regardless of who actually 
ordered the decision, the deceptive process just outlined added legitimacy to a government then 
struggling with self-reform.61 Apropos of this Alexander II could therefore appear less the 
autocrat and more the mediator within a new-style political apparatus. 
 
The policy on Sakhalin 
The 1871 decision on Sakhalin was followed by several years of inaction. It is not entirely clear 
what accounts for this, though it may have been due to Timashev’s lack of administrative skills. 62 
Whatever the case, when the Commission for the Organization of Katorga Labor (Kommisiia po 
organizatsii katorzhnykh rabot – KOKR) finally convened in Petersburg on 1 March 1875, one of 
its two major tasks was to design both a policy and institutions necessary to facilitating 
Sakhalin’s transformation into a penal colony. Its other task was to approve or disapprove the 
leasing of Dué’s coalmining operations to Court Councilor I. N. Butkovskii, major shareholder 
in the Sakhalin Company.63 Only the first of these tasks concerns us here; but the importance the 
government attached to both is suggested by those it named to KOKR. M. R. Shidlovskii, 
chairman, was a senator and member of the General Staff, and was until six months earlier 
Timashev’s second-in-command at the MVD.64 Other members included Engineer and 
Lieutenant-General L. A. Sokolovskii, Senator and Privy Councilor E. V. Frish,65 Privy 
Councilors A. I. Despot-Zenovich,66 A. P. Beklemishev, P. T. Kititsyn, Count V. A. Sollogub,67 
and O. I. Kvist,68 and Major-General A. I. Belenchenko.69 
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It is remarkable that KOKR’s first meeting began with several members openly questioning 
the suitability of Sakhalin as a location for the penal colony. Sokolovskii curtly reminded them 
that this question had already been decided “between 1869 and 1871”. (Note this further 
undermines the claims of Timashev et al.) But the dissenters were not immediately deterred. As a 
result the session ended with a decision to form a “Special Conference” consisting of Despot-
Zenovich, Beklemishev, and State Councilors O. A. Deikhman and Vlasov70 to yet again confirm 
Sakhalin’s suitability.7l 
As with Vlasov’s 1871 “findings” the decision reached by the Special Conference appears to 
have been preordained. Minutes of a series of eight meetings between 3 and 22 March 1875 
show the four members confirmed the island possessed a wealth of natural resources and 
conditions virtually requiring its transformation into a penal colony. Indeed, so promising were 
the possibilities that Vlasov et al. recommended Sakhalin’s future katorga administration consist 
not only of a prison division but a farm division as well.72 
There is no evidence that KOKR or any of its members convened between the end of March and 
22 September 1875. The hiatus was probably due to the necessity to await the outcome of high-level 
negotiations with Japan which culminated in the St. Petersburg Treaty (signed in May and August 
and formally effected in September).73 Another factor may have been a desire to await clarification of 
the future for coal-mining operations on the island: just prior to KOKR’s 22 September session the 
government finalized a lease agreement with the Sakhalin Company.74 Whatever the case, on this 
date KOKR turned its full attention to determining the manner in which the Sakhalin penal colony 
would function. In this and another session a week later it unanimously decided the colony would be 
“permanent” as opposed to “temporary” (i.e., experimental). This was important because it 
represented the government’s absolute commitment to a plan it believed would initiate a new era of 
penal labor, as in fact it did, though not in the manner forecast. Also during these two sessions the 
notion of establishing a farm division within the new administration was abandoned. Vlasov seems to 
have been the architect behind this idea, having proposed as early as 1873 the creation of two labor 
farms, one for 600 men and another for 400 women. However KOKR decided to establish additional 
prisons in place of these proposed farms.75 Although this penological retreat did not mark the end of 
efforts to turn exiles into peasants, it was a tacit admission that the penal colony’s primary purpose 
was not the transformation (much less the rehabilitation) of criminals, but rather their banishment and 
punishment. 
KOKR’s final session appears to have taken place on 6 October 1875. This session was 
important because the commission decided to give the military commander of the island’s new 
administration extensive judicial authority over the exile population. For crimes committed on 
the island he alone would possess the awesome power to both determine guilt and dispense 
punishment.76 Recognizing the abusive opportunities immanent in this disturbing marriage of 
powers, members O. I. Kvist and M. N. Bazhenov submitted a formal protest in which they 
cited not only its violation of the Exile Code (Ustav o ssyl’nykh) but presciently added it 
may in practice lead not only to serious difficulties in terms of implementation, but [also] provoke 
among katurzhnye a dangerous conviction of the injustice of the punishments, which in turn may not 
bring about desired results.77 
Chairman Shidlovskii duly noted Kvist’s and Bazhenov’s protest, then promptly dismissed it 
from the agenda. 
The establishment of the penal colony began slowly, Although the delay was in part due to the 
dilatoriness still characterizing Russia’s bureaucrats, it was also caused by the problems detailed 
above concerning agriculture and supply. Yet there were other factors as well, which originated in 
the capital. One was the numerous changes in the leadership of the MVD during this period. Between 
1878 and 1882 four different men were appointed to head the ministry. It was not until the 
comparatively stable (and especially harsh) rule of D. A. Tolstoi (1882-1889) that the government 
was finally able to get the penal colony up and running in a semi-functional manner. Another factor 
which stymied MVD efforts to draw attention and resources for the colony was the assassination of 
Alexander II that plunged all ministries into turmoil. Finally, it was not until 1884 that the 
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government restructured Eastern Siberia, removing from GUVS’s control the Russian Far East and 
Sakhalin and giving these territories to the newly-created Governor-generalship of Priamur krai.78 On 
the island itself a single commander took charge over three new districts – Aleksandrovsk, Tymovsk, 
and Korsakovsk – and Aleksandrovsk Post replaced Dué as administrative center.79 For all these 
reasons it was not until the mid-1880s that katorga operations on Sakhalin began to follow a version 
(albeit bastardized) of the policy KOKR had laid out years before. 
“[F]rom 1879 through 1883, inclusive”, reads an MVD report dated October 1885, “525 
katorzhnye arrestees were shipped to Sakhalin every year, and 1050 in the years 1884 and 1885”.80 
By the time the island’s new administration was installed in 1884 the katorzhnye population stood 
at 4000. When Chekhov visited in 1891 there were around 6000 katorzhnye and 4000 exile-
settlers.81 The latest available figure comes from the 1897 census, which shows a total exile 
population of some 22000.82 This edged close to the figure of 25-30 thousand Vlasov had 
projected in 1873; but he had also envisioned these masses would be economically self-
sufficient, which they were not. The penal colony disintegrated as a result of the Japanese 
invasion of the island during the 1904-1905 war. Although the Portsmouth Treaty allowed 
Russia to keep the northern half of the island, the government decided to abolish officially the 
penal colony in April 1906.83 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated in non-linear fashion the chronological development by which Sakhalin 
became “the most notorious penal settlement in the world”. During the 1860s the total collapse of 
the system of katorga in Eastern Siberia compelled Petersburg to believe it needed a penal colony on 
Sakhalin in order to keep the system viable. Yet due to the factors discussed – ramifications of the 
“collapse of katorga”; pressure from top officials; ignoring or ignorance of mitigating evidence; and 
the way in which the decision to establish a penal colony was made, then transformed into policy – 
the eventual colony became a man-made hell exhibiting the worst tendencies of Imperial Russia’s 
criminal justice system. On the one hand, Sakhalin served to funnel into a crucible many of the 
internal tensions then wracking society; on the other, the decisions which eventually created so 
much suffering show that when it came to such fundamental issues as political leadership and 
management of the country’s penal system, the autocracy during its final half-century no longer 
possessed an ability to reform itself, if indeed it ever really did. 
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